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JOHNSON v. UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS OF CLEVELAND:
PUBLIC POLICY
OVER TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES
INTRODUCTION
In Bowman v. Davis,' the Ohio Supreme Court recognized wrongful preg-
nancy as a valid cause of action.2 The Court stated:
For this court to endorse a policy that makes physicians liable for the
foreseeable consequences of all negligently performed operations except
those involving sterilization would constitute an impermissible in-
fringement of a fundamental right.3
A number of justices and commentators have interpreted Bowman as support
for the recovery of child rearing expenses in wrongful pregnancy actions.4 However,
the Bowman court did not conclusively settle the issue of recoverable damages.5 In
Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland,6 the Ohio Supreme Court limited its
holding in Bowman v. Davis7 to damages from the pregnancy itself' and denied the
I Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
2 A wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception claim results when parents seek damages stemming from
a doctor's negligent performance of a sterilization procedure followed by a subsequent birth. See Johnson
v. University Hosp., 44 Ohio St. 3d 49,540 N.E.2d 1370 (1989) (This cause of action should be characterized
as one for wrongful conception because the physician's negligence occurred before conception.) See also
infra note 10 (discussing the difference between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful conception).
Wrongful birth "refers to a cause of action whereby parents, on their own behalf, seek to recover
damages for the birth of an impaired child when the impairment was caused by the defendant's failure to
diagnose or discover a genetic defect in the parents or the infant through prenatal testing or counseling in time
for the parents to obrain a eugenic abortion or to prevent pregnancy altogether." Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d
at 51, 540 N.E.2d at 1372.
Wrongful life is an action brought on behalf of the child, "claiming damages due to the negligent failure
of physicians to steilize [his] parents." Bowman, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 45 n.3, 356 N.E.2d at 499 n.3.
I/d. at 45,356 N.E.2d at 499. See generally Note, Wrongful Conception: North Carolina's Newest Prenatal
Tort Claim: Jackson v. Bumgardner, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1077, 1096 (1987) [hereinafter Prenatal Tort]
(discussing the fundamental right to practice contraception).
4 See Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 815 n. 1 (Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("A minority of courts have not departed from common law principles and allowed the recovery of
child rearing expenses offset by the beneficial value the parents will receive from having a normal, healthy
child.") See also Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484,488 n.2,453 A.2d 974,978 n.2 (1982) (O'Brien,
C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Bowman as support for the proposition that child rearing expenses
are not against public policy); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (same);
and Prenatal Tort, supra note 3, at 1086 n.82 (interpreting Bowman as support for the full recovery rule).
5 Bowman, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 44, 356 N.E.2d at 498. The court declined to settle the issue of recoverable
damages because it was not raised at the appellate level. Id. at 44 n. 1, 356 N.E.2d at 498 n. 1. The court did
state that this is "a traditional negligence action" and is "not barred by notions of public policy." Id. at 45,
356 N.E.2d at 499.
6 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 540 N.E.2d 1370.
7 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496.
"These damages may include, but are not limited to, medical expenses and loss of consortium during the
pregnancy and birth, emotional distress during that time, the mother's lost wages during a reasonable length
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foreseeable child rearing expenses.9
This Note will examine the policies and principles relating to the recovery of
child rearing expenses in wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception'1 actions.
This Note contends that the Johnson majority overemphasized certain policy con-
siderations and was mistaken in allowing these policies to override traditional legal
principles.
FACTS AND HOLDING
On March 4, 1982, Ruth Johnson underwent a tubal ligation operation" for
sterilization purposes at the University Hospitals of Cleveland.' 2 Johnson alleged
the operation was negligently performed. 3 Johnson became pregnant in July 1982,
and delivered a healthy baby girl on April 27, 1983.14 On July 27, 1983, Johnson filed
suit against the University Hospitals of Cleveland and three physicians employed by
the hospital. 15
In her complaint, Johnson requested damages for prenatal and postnatal care;
specifically the additional cost and expense required to care of and raise a child to
majority age.' 6 The damages were an estimated three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000.00).17
The trial court submitted the claim to a medical arbitration panel."5 The panel
of time, and the mother's pain and suffering during the pregnancy and childbirth." Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d
at 58 n.8, 540 N.E.2d at 1378 n.8.
9 Id. at 58, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
" Some courts and commentators have drawn a distinction between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful
conception arguing the proximate cause relationship is stronger in wrongful conception cases. See, e.g.,
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (1977) (Referring to the cause of action as wrongful
conception because "it is at the point of conception that the injury claimed by the parefits originates.") See
generally Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays For Bringing Up Baby?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 418, 418-
19 n.7, 430 n.86 (1978) [hereinafter Who Pays] (discussing the close proximate cause relationship between
preconception negligence and the birth of a child); and Prenatal Tort, supra note 3, at 1094 (distinguishing
proximate cause in wrongful pregnancy and conception).
Wrongful pregnancy relates to post-conception negligence such as the physician's failure to diagnose
pregnancy in time for an abortion. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976)
(unsuccessful abortion) and Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 11. App. 3d 271,273, 425 N.E.2d 968,970, rev'd
95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983) (failure to diagnose). For the
purposes of this Note the term wrongful pregnancy will refer to both preconception and post-conception neg-
ligence. The term wrongful conception will refer exclusively to preconception negligence.
I I A tubal ligation is a permanent sterilization procedure in which the fallopian tubes are tied and cut to prevent
the union of egg and sperm which results in conception. See Prenatal Tort, supra note 3, at 1082.
12 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 49, 540 N.E.2d at 1370.
13 Id.
'4 Id. at 49-50, 540 N.E.2d at 1370-71.
1 Id. at 49, 540 N.E.2d at 1370.
16 Id. at 50, 540 N.E.2d at 1371.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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recommended a finding against the University Hospitals and one of the physicians. 19
The panel found that Johnson was not entitled to child rearing expenses on the
grounds that the value of the child's love, aid and society would substantially
outweigh the monetary expense.2 ° Johnson contested the arbitration award and
appealed for a trial de novo.21 Subsequently, Johnson settled all claims except the
claim for child rearing expenses.22
At trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the claim for child rearing ex-
penses.23 The trial court granted the motion on the ground that "under Ohio law there
is no legally cognizable claim for wrongful birth or wrongful pregnancy.' 
24
Johnson appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals. 25 In a two-to-
one decision, the court of appeals recognized the claim of wrongful pregnancy, but
limited the recoverable damages to those arising from the pregnancy itself.26 The
Ohio Supreme Court granted Johnson's motion to certify the record.27
In a six-to-one decision, the Court adopted the limited damages rule,
allowing recovery for damages from the "pregnancy itself," 29 but no recovery for
child rearing expenses. 30
The Court rejected the no recovery rule on the ground that it was "clearly in
conflict with the traditional concepts of tort law." 31 Likewise the Court rejected the
full recovery rule on the ground that "the strict rules of tort should not be applied to
an action to which they are not suited, such as a wrongful pregnancy case, in which
a doctor's tortious conduct permits to occur the birth of a child rather than the causing
of an injury." 32
The Ohio Supreme Court opposed the benefits rule "because of the impossi-
bility of a jury placing a price tag on a child's benefits to her parents." 33 The Court
19 Id.
0 Id.
21 Id.
2 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Johnson v. University Hosp., No. 53192 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 1988), affd, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49,540N.E.2d
1370 (1989).
26 The appellate court held that recovery of child rearing expenses would be a windfall to the parents. Also,
that the benefit of child rearing is too speculative and therefore impossible to weigh against the cost of child
rearing. The court also relied on the theory that the child could be emotionally harmed upon learning that
she was unwanted. Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 51, 540 N.E.2d at 1371.
27 Johnson v. University Hosp., 37 Ohio St. 3d 701, 531 N.E.2d 1319 (1988).
2 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 540 N.E.2d 1370 (H. Brown, J., dissenting).
29 See supra note 8.
30 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 58. 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 ld.
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adopted the limited damages rule as most persuasive. Citing Day v. Gulley,34 the
Court stated: "In Ohio, a tort recovery may not be had for damages which are
speculative." 35 The Court reasoned that allowing child rearing expenses would
invite undue speculation and "ethically questionable assessments" of the psycho-
logical ramifications of the birth on the siblings and parents, and the emotional and
pecuniary expense of rearing an unplanned child.
3 6
The Court pointed out that child rearing expenses were not recognized at
common law in an action for wrongful pregnancy, "just as damages were not
recognized in an action for wrongful death." 37 Therefore, the court reasoned that
child rearing expenses will not be recognized until the General Assembly establishes
guidelines.3" The Court concluded that "the extent of recoverable damages is
limited by Ohio's public policy that the birth of a normal, healthy child cannot be an
injury to her parents. ' 39
BACKGROUND: RECOVERABLE DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
There are four competing damage theories in wrongful pregnancy actions: no
recovery, full recovery, limited damages and the benefits rule. Only the last two are
generally accepted.
40
I. Limited Damages
The majority of courts have adopted the limited damages rule, which does not
allow recovery for child rearing expenses.4 Generally, recoverable damages
include costs associated with future sterilization, prenatal and postnatal care, pain
and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium.
42
4 175 Ohio St. 83, 191 N.E.2d 732 (1963).
31 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 58, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
" Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 58-59, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
o Early cases held that the birth of a normal, healthy child was not a compensable injury, thus known as the
"no recovery" rule. See Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123,255 N.W. 620 (1934). The "full recovery"
rule is based on the principle that a child is a foreseeable consequence of a negligent sterilization and "if this
change in the family status can be measured economically it should be as compensable as the... [other]
losses." Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323-24,59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967). See also Stills v.
Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (acknowledged the full recovery rule but applied
the benefits rule).
"' See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980),petition for review denied, 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981); Byrd v. Wesley Medical
Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (1985); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Macomber v.
Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D. 2d 339,470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983); Jackson
v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d
974 (1982); C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988); Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301
(1986); McKeman v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,687 P.2d 850 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872
(W.Va. 1985); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
42 See cases cited supra note 41.
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The denial of child rearing expenses is based on a number of considerations.
Many courts have expressed the idea that parents cannot be damaged by the birth of
a normal, healthy child.43 The benefits of the child's love, aid, joy, and companion-
ship far outweigh any costs the parents will incur raising the child." "Rather than
attempt to value these intangible benefits, our courts have simply determined that
public sentiment recognizes that these benefits to the parents outweigh their
economic loss in rearing and educating a healthy, normal child." 45
Another policy consideration in support of the limited damages rule is that
successful recovery of child rearing expenses will have an adverse effect on the
child.4 6 Courts citing this proposition contend that recovery of child rearing
expenses "will undermine society's need for a strong and healthy family relation-
ship." 4 7 They fear that the child will become an "emotional bastard" upon learning
that he was unwanted and reared with funds forcibly obtained from another.
48
Some jurisdictions have adopted the view that the nature of child rearing
damages is speculative and recovery may not be had for damages which are
uncertain. 49 In Coleman v. Garrison,° the court stated that this principle applied to
any attempt to measure the value of human life against the costs.5' "How.can it be
said within the ambit of legal predictability that the monetary cost of that life is worth
more than its value?' 
52
Additionally, some courts have expressed the opinion that recognizing child
rearing expenses as an element of damages is the equivalent of recognizing the
nonexistence of the child as a benefit.5 3
With the foregoing policy considerations in mind, many courts express the
concern that recovery of child rearing expenses is a windfall to the parents, who
receive all the benefits without any corresponding liabilities.5 4 Some argue that
recovery is "out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasor" and would encour-
age fraudulent claims.
5 5
43 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 58-59, 540 N.E.2d at 1378. See cases cited supra note 41.
44 See cases cited supra note 41.
45 Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
46 See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 243-44, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. at 187, 343 S.E.2d at 307; Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d at 12; Johnson
v. University Hosp., 44 Ohio St. 3d at 58, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
10 Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
11 Id. at 12.
52 Id.
13 See Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 181-182, 347 S.E.2d 743, 748-749 (1986). But see Johnson,
44 Ohio St. 3d at 56, 540 N.E.2d at 1376 (refusing to recognize any attempt to charn teri, wr ngfI
pregnancy action as a wrongful life action.)
5 See cases cited supra note 41.
15 Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
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AKRON LAW REVIEW
Lastly, some limited damage jurisdictions 56 reject the benefits rule as a mis-
application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 17 These courts contend that the
benefits rule only applies "when the harm and benefit occur to the same interest." 8
Simply stated, they contend that the financial injury to the parents cannot be offset
by the intangible emotional benefits of a child.59
II. Benefits Rule
A significant minority of jurisdictions 60 have adopted the benefits rule derived
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or his property and in doing so has conferred a special benefit to the
interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit
conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this
is equitable. 61
These courts recognize the costs of raising an unplanned child as a foreseeable
consequence of a physician's negligence. 62 "The physician's negligence has forced
upon them burdens which they sought and had a right to avoid by submitting to
sterilization.' '63
University ofArizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court 4 is a leading
case supporting the benefits rule. The Supreme Court of Arizona found it preferable
to permit the jury "to consider both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements of
damage which pertain to the rearing and education of the child," offset by the
"pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits which the parents will receive from the
relationship with the child."65
According to the benefits rule, the extent of recoverable damages will vary
56 See, e.g., Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 53-54, 540 N.E.2d at 1374.
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
58 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 53, 540 N.E.2d at 1374.
11 Id. "Damages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest
has been benefited." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment b (1979)). But see
University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579 n.4, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 n.4
(1983) (noting that the benefits rule is based on unjust enrichment and that a strict interpretation of the rule
in wrongful pregnancy cases would result in unjust enrichment).
60 See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983);
University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center, 136 Ariz. 579,667 P.2d 1294, (1983); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Jones v.
Malinowksi, 299 Md. 257,473 A.2d429 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511(1971);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
62 See Jones, 299 Md. at 270, 473 A.2d at 436.
63 Id.
14 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294.
65 Id. at 584, 667 P.2d at 1299.
[Vol. 23:3
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depending on the circumstances of the individual parents. 66 Under this approach,
great weight will be given to the plaintiff's reason for submitting to the sterilization.
67
Thus, the jury would consider whether sterilization was sought for therapeutic
reasons--to prevent injury to the mother; eugenic--to prevent birth defects or;
economic--to avoid the additional cost of raising a child.68 In addition, the jury
would consider family size, family income, the age of the parents, and marital
status.
69
The benefits rule rejects the policy considerations at the heart of the limited
damages rule.7" Adherents of the benefits rule reject the proposition that the nature
of child rearing expenses is too speculative. 7 Jones stated that calculating the cost
of raising a child is commonplace and based on established economic principles.72
The primary area of complexity in assessing damages is determining the extent of
the offsetting benefit to the parents.73 The Supreme Court of Arizona felt that juries
routinely assess such intangible factors, both emotional and pecuniary, and new
rules were not necessary to assess damages in wrongful pregnancy cases.
74
Another proposition rejected by the minority view is that the benefits the
parents receive from raising a healthy child far outweigh any costs associated with
child rearing.75 The Arizona Supreme Court recognized that this would be true in
most cases, but thought it unrealistic to assume in all cases. 76 In Hartke v.
McKelway,7 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
with this proposition, and stated: "When a couple has chosen not to have children,
or not to have any more children, the suggestion arises for them, at least, the birth of
a child would not be a net benefit."78
ANALYSIS
I. The Birth of a Child as an Injury
Prior to Johnson, some courts and commentators interpreted the Bowman
6 Id. at 585, 667 P.2d at 1300.
67 Id. at 585, 667 P.2d at 1300. See, e.g., Jones, 299 Md. at 270-71, 473 A.2d at 436.
68 Jones, 299 Md. at 270-71, 473 A.2d at 436.
69 Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at 257, 187 N.W.2d at 519. But see Rinard v. Biczak, 177 Mich. App. 287,
441 N.W.2d 441 (1989) (denying application of the benefits rule and calling on the Michigan Supreme Court
to resolve the conflict).
70 See cases cited supra note 60.
1' Jones, 299 Md. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. at 582-83, 667 P.2d at 1297-98.
71 Id. at 583-84. 667 P.2d at 1298-99.
76 Id.
77 Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544.
78 Id. at 1552.
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decision as support for the full recovery rule.7 9 Following traditional tort principles,
this interpretation is preferable to the value laden limited damages rule adopted in
Johnson."°
The limited damages rule is largely based on public policy considerations. 8'
Most of the considerations supporting the limited damages rule stem from the belief
that the birth of a normal, healthy child cannot constitute an injury to the parents
because the benefits of having a child outweigh any economic loss which the parents
might incur in rearing and educating a healthy child.8" This stance is inconsistent
with the holding in Bowman. 3 The birth of a child is clearly a foreseeable
consequence of a negligently performed sterilization operation.84 When a couple
seeks legal sterilization to avoid the birth of a child, and the physician's negligence
subverts this choice, how can it be said there is no injury as a matter of public
policy?85 Undoubtedly raising a child carries an intrinsic benefit.8 6 However, as a
matter of public policy, this proposition ignores the reality of individual circum-
stances.87
Courts adopting the limited damages rule imply that the benefits rule casts an
aspersion on the value of human life. 8 These jurisdictions interpret the benefits rule
as saying the child is an injury to the parents.89 The injury complained of occurs at
the point of conception.9" The harm is the direct physical and financial injury
resulting from conception and deprivation of the right to limit procreation. 91 "That
right is legally protectable and need not be justified or explained.' '92
'9 See supra note 4.
'0 In most cases we could join in the 'universally shared emotion and sentiment' expressed by the majority
... but we do not hold office to impose our views of morality by deciding cases on the basis of personal
emotion and sentiment." University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center, 136 Ariz. at 583, 667 P.2d at 1298.
81 See Prenatal Tort, supra note 3 at 1094-95 n. 166.
82 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 41.
13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d at 813 (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 "Public policy. That principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against the public good." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
86 See supra note 80.
87 See generally Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (parents already had seven children);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (same); University of Ariz. Health Sciences
Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (parents with three children seek to limit the size of
the family); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257,473 A.2d 429 (limited finances, family of three children, one
with brain disease, one with heart disease); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (four
children followed by birth of twins, one with birth defects).
88 See cases cited supra note 41.
89 Id.
9 See Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175. See also Hickman v. Group Health Plan, 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986)
(equal protection claim questioning the validity of MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1), (2), & (3) (1984), which allow
wrongful pregnancy actions but disallow wrongful life and birth actions).
91 Id.
92 Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 111. App. 3d 271,273,425 N.E.2d 968, 970 (1981), rev'd, 95 111. 2d 193,447
N.E.2d 385, cert. denied sub. nom. Raja v. Michael Reese Hosp., 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
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The policy behind the limited damages rule is inconsistent because it does not
avert placing a value on the benefits of a child.93 This inconsistency becomes
apparent once it is recognized that if the conception and birth of a child cannot be an
injury to the parents then there is absolutely no basis for any recovery whatsoever. 94
Justice Brown succinctly stated, "[t]here is no rational difference between the
damages caused by the [wrongfuli pregnancy itself95 and the child rearing ex-
penses." 96 Would the courts adopting the limited damage rule have us believe that
children are worth the costs of raising but not worth the costs associated with
pregnancy and birth?
A. Psychological Damage
In Wilbur v. Kerr,97 it was feared that the child would suffer an emotional
injury upon learning that he was unwanted and raised on the funds of another.9 8
Disallowing child rearing expenses will not protect against this possibility.99 The
child is likely to get the same impression upon learning the parents sued for the costs
of the pregnancy itself.'00
One court adopted the practice of using only the initials of the plaintiff's name
to protect against any possible psychological damage to the child.'0 ' If the courts are
so concerned about possible emotional damage to the child, they can adopt similar
practices. The fear of psychological damage should not be elevated to a public policy
consideration militating against the benefits rule.
II. Negligence
The Ohio Supreme Court's comparison of wrongful pregnancy and wrongful
death is misplaced. 102 Wrongful death statutes became necessary because the
common law did not recognize wrongful death as a cause of action.13 However,
wrongful pregnancy claims are medical malpractice actions based on the traditional
principles of negligence, 1°4 and "negligence is almost as old as the common law." 105
91 See, e.g., Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d at 813 (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94 Id. at 814.
91 See supra note 8 (referring to recoverable damages in limited damage jurisdictions).
96 Johnson v. University Hosp., 44 Ohio St. 3d at 61,540 N.E.2d at 1380 (Brown, J., dissenting).
97 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982)
91 Id. at 243-44, 628 S.W.2d at 571.
99 See Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 61,540 N.E.2d at 1380 (Brown, J., dissenting).
100 Id.
101 C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504.
102 "We believe that if such expenses are to be recognized, it is the role of the General Assembly to establish
guidelines in a 'wrongful pregnancy' action as the legislature has done in 'wrongful death' actions."
Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 58, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
103 See, e.g., W.P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984); Schork
-j. I Nuber, 648 S..2d ai 865 (Leibson, I., dissenting).
104 See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. at 272-73,473 A.2d at 437; Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 59,540 N.E.2d
at 1379 (Brown, J., dissenting).
105 Schork, 648 S.W.2d at 865 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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The Ohio Supreme Court, as most other state courts, has recognized a cause
of action for wrongful pregnancy. 0 6 Therefore, in the absence of legislative action
to the contrary, wrongful pregnancy claims should be judged in light of the
traditional principles of negligence.10 7 "The fact that this particular claim involves
some moralistic and social overtones having to do with contraception and childbirth
should not be permitted to become the handmaiden for the destruction of our
established notions of tort law." 0 8 The Ohio Supreme Court illustrated its question-
able authority to make this policy decision when it stated, "the General Assembly
is the proper forum in which the competing social philosophies involved in
'wrongful pregnancy' actions should be considered in establishing the law." 109 This
departure from the established principles of tort law is the equivalent of judicial
legislation.
When a physician breaches his duty to a patient, resulting in injury, he is liable
for the foreseeable consequences of his actions."l "Where the purpose of the
physician's actions is to prevent conception or birth, elementary justice requires that
he be held legally responsible for the consequences which have in fact occurred." 1
III. Speculative Damages
A number of limited damage jurisdictions state that the nature of child rearing
damages cannot be established with reasonable certainty and are too speculative.' 
12
Citing Day v. Gulley,"I3 the Ohio Supreme court stated, "a tort recovery may not be
had for damages which are speculative." 114 But Day is clearly distinguishable from
the case at hand. In Day, the issue was whether the plaintiff needed objective
evidence of her injury'15 to prove damages with reasonable certainty. 1 6 The Ohio
Supreme Court held that absent objective evidence of the injury, the plaintiff's
subjective testimony left the jury to pure speculation as to assessing the damages.1 17
In other words, the plaintiff did not meet the burden of production in proving the
existence of any damages.
1 6 See, e.g., Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496.
107 "Recovery for negligence is grounded upon four elements: (1) a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff,
(2) a breach of that duty (failure to act with due care), (3) a proximate cause relationship between the breach
of duty and the resulting damages, and (4) provable damages." Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 540 N.E.2d
at 1379 (Brown, J., dissenting).
'o Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d at 293 (Rose, J., dissenting).
9 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 540 N.E.2d at 1378 (emphasis added).
"o See supra note 10.
.. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 174.
12 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. at 187, 343 S.E.2d at 307.
113 175 Ohio St. 83, 191 N.E.2d 732 (1963).
114 Johnson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 58, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
" Plaintiff claimed to suffer a permanent back injury due to the defendant's negligent driving. Day, 175
Ohio St. at 84, 191 N.E.2d at 733.
6 Id. at 88-89, 191 N.E.2d at 735-36.
"7 See id. at 89, 191 N.E.2d at 736 (plaintiff failed to present objective medical evidence confirming the
existence of the alleged injury).
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PUBLIC POLICY OVER TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES
It is common knowledge that raising a child is a financial burden. 1!8 Therefore,
when a child is born as the result of a negligently performed sterilization operation,
a direct financial injury is reasonably certain. The only speculative activity is
determining to what degree the child is a benefit to the parents. 19 The United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of speculative damages and stated: "The rule
which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable to
the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount." 2 o The Court also stated
that "the risk of uncertainty should be thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of upon
the injured party.''
Finally, the Restatement of the Law of Torts122 supplies the traditional rule in
relation to the certainty of damages:
It is desirable, also, that there be definiteness of proof of the amount of
damage as far as is reasonably possible. It is even more desirable,
however, that an injured person not be deprived of substantial compen-
sation merely because he cannot prove with complete certainty the
extent of harm he has suffered. 123
Ascertaining the cost of child rearing expenses can be done with reasonable
certainty. 24 It is undisputed that physical and financial injury results from negligent
sterilization procedures. It seems patently unjust that recovery of all child rearing
expenses should be denied on the ground that there is some unquantifiable benefit
in raising a child.
CONCLUSION
Family planning is not against public policy. 25 The use of contraception and
sterilization to prevent conception is commonplace in the United States and the rest
of the world. 126 It is estimated that eighty-three percent of women vulnerable to
unplanned pregnancy exercise some type of birth control to avoid pregnancy. 27
The case for birth control has been sold to the American people and is
IS See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436.
119 Id.
120 Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Co., 282 U.S. 555,562 (1930). See generally Who Pays, supra note
10, at 429-30 (discussing the measurement of damages).
121 Story Parchment Co., 282 U.S. at 563 (citing Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 550-56).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 comment a (1979).
123 Id.
124 Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. at 272, 473 A.2d at 436.
' Sevaupra unie 85; see infra note 128 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at 245, 187 N.W.2d at 516-17; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d at 175 n.9.
127 L. HAmRs, INSIDE AMERICA 178 (1987).
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well beyond major contention. For example, by a nearly unanimous
87% to 12%, most people are convinced that the best way to avoid the
need for abortion is to have better contraception in the first place so that
no pregnancy occurs.
28
The use of contraception and sterilization is a responsible choice made long
before the wrongful conception occurs.' 29 The limited damage rule punishes the
unwary plaintiff and releases the tortfeasor from the foreseeable consequences of his
own negligence. Compensatory damages for the cost of rearing a child would place
the plaintiffs in the position they would have been in had no wrong occurred.'30 In
addition, the prospect of child rearing expenses would serve as a deterrent to the
negligent performance of sterilization operations.'II
A wrongful pregnancy claim is simply a medical malpractice or negligence
action. It is a well known principle that when a physician is negligent, liability is
imposed for the foreseeable consequences of his acts. However, in wrongful
pregnancy cases, many jurisdictions have mistakenly confused value judgments
with traditional tort principles. A wrongful pregnancy action is based on the
principle that the parents had a lawful choice to determine whether or not to have
children. In wrongful conception cases, the decision not to procreate was made long
before conception. Irrespective of the reasons behind this choice, the physician's
negligence has subverted the plaintiff's lawful decision and cast a great financial
burden on the plaintiff. The wrongdoer should not be able to invoke the shield of
public policy as a defense for his own negligence.
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS
2I id. at 182.
129 See Johnson v. University Hosp., 44 Ohio St. 3d at 60, 540 N.E.2d at 1380 (Brown, J., dissenting).
)30 See Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175.
131 Id.
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